










Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/114905                                                     
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
Abstract 
This article discusses empirical approaches to criminal procedure, focusing on three broad 
and recurring themes that reflect the complex nature of the criminal justice system as a social 
institution: legal culture, discretion, and policy. It first considers criminal justice in the 
context of its sociopolitical culture, taking into account the place of legal and occupational 
cultures and the ways that they influence criminal justice law and practice. It also looks at 
culture as rhetoric before reviewing studies that explore some routine criminal justice 
practices, particularly how criminal justice institutions, such as the police and the 
prosecution, exercise discretion, and factors that affect a jury’s decision-making. Finally, it 
examines the relationship between law and policy, and more specifically how public policies 
(such as austerity) impact criminal justice practices, and how empirical research on law has 
contributed to evidence-based policy. 
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I. Introduction 
It is difficult to think of any area of law where empirical research can be more valuable in 
understanding its core than that of criminal justice, or more precisely, criminal procedure. As 
Meares suggests, empiricism’s relevance to criminal procedure is almost banal.1 In 
operationalizing the norms of criminal law and justice, criminal procedure defines the limits 
of state power in bringing offenders to justice, and it sets the conditions under which 
individual freedoms can be restricted or removed. In this way criminal justice is an important 
manifestation of state power and sovereignty and the values upheld by the state, or at least the 
government of the day. Understanding the nature and exercise of this power beyond the 
rhetorical claims of government has the potential to tell us something about the fundamental 
relationship between the state and the individual. 
Empirical research is well placed to contribute to this understanding. Statistical 
information can provide crucial baseline data, demonstrating the dominant forms of case 
disposal, attrition rates within certain offense types, or the different case pathways and 
outcomes experienced by young offenders or those of color, for example. Qualitative studies 
are able to go beyond this and unpack legal actors’ motivations as well as the institutional, 
economic, sociopolitical, and professional drivers and constraints they experience in carrying 
out their role. Observational methods in particular show us the “fine-grained institutional 
                                                
1 Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure—And 
Three Answers, 517 U. Ill. L. Rev. 851, 852 (2002). 
details” and the ways that processes and organizations function in practice—not only in the 
binary sense of what is within or outside what is permitted by the law, but also in the vast 
expanse that lies between these two points, in the exercise of discretion.2 
In addition to deepening our understanding of the practices of criminal justice, we might 
also consider why we need empirical evidence to understand criminal procedure at all. Why 
do we not assume that criminal justice practice conforms to the rhetoric of the law and simply 
trust state officials to do a good job in keeping us safe and punishing only those guilty 
individuals? By asking this question, we are suggesting that empirical researchers are 
inherently skeptical. This skepticism is important in a democratic society, given that criminal 
justice deals with the exercise of the coercive power of the state. Independent empirical 
accounts of practice can reveal unknown and unforeseen ways in which law operates, 
offering the perspectives of those operationalizing the criminal process as well as those who 
are its subjects. It provides a broader understanding of legal, occupational and political 
cultures, the ideologies of legal actors, and the impact of these features on the daily 
experiences of suspects, defendants, victims, witnesses, and those working within the 
criminal justice process. It interrogates external factors such as compliance with human rights 
standards and pan-European legislative measures; domestic policies such as managerialism 
and austerity that demand faster, cheaper justice; and more overtly political drivers that 
govern and shape criminal justice in sometimes unarticulated ways. And perhaps most 
important, in mapping the exercise of state power, it can provide a form of accountability and 
a measure of legitimacy. 
A chapter of this nature is necessarily selective. It would be impossible to do justice to 
the huge variety of empirical studies on criminal justice across different topics and 
jurisdictions. Instead, we have chosen three broad and recurring themes that capture 
                                                
2 Robert M. Lawless, What Empirical Legal Scholars Do Best, 87 Temple L. Rev. 711, 715 (2015). 
something of the criminal justice system as a complex social institution—legal culture, 
discretion, and policy. In the first section, we explore criminal justice from a sociopolitical 
perspective, examining the place of legal and occupational cultures and their influence on 
criminal justice law and practice. The second section focuses on the studies that shed light on 
some routine criminal justice practices, particularly how criminal justice institutions, such as 
the police and the prosecution, exercise discretion, and factors that influence juries’ decision-
making. Finally, the last section investigates the relationship between law and policy, that is, 
how public policies (such as austerity) impact criminal justice practices, as well as how 
empirical research on law has facilitated evidence-based policy. 
II. Legal Culture, Rhetoric, and Reality 
By referring to criminal justice as a system, we do not mean to suggest that it is a well-
orchestrated unit, comprised of interdependent official agencies working toward a clear and 
common goal. This conjured harmonious image is a long way from the realities of criminal 
justice, where multiple and sometimes competing aims are pursued by different participants, 
who may be in ignorance of one another, or in competition over the allocation of 
responsibility or funding. These contrasting aims influence the way in which those working 
in criminal justice agencies perceive their own role, and the development of professional 
cultures and ideologies in response to the challenges and constraints of practice.3 Added to 
this, the decisions of federal-level and supreme courts, or the supranational layers of 
European Union (EU) criminal justice and the fair trial requirements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), place demands on national systems that are 
                                                
3 Malcolm Davies et al., Criminal Justice 11 (2010). 
sometimes hard to incorporate.4 Thus, decision-making, albeit undertaken by the individuals 
within criminal justice institutions, should be seen as part of a wider collectively defined 
enterprise. 
This holistic perspective, as Hawkins has argued, is the key to the comprehension of 
decision-making in the criminal process.5 Hawkins suggests that the social context, which 
shapes the decision-making process, can be understood in three dimensional layers, namely 
surround, field, and frame. The surround is concerned with the social, political, and 
economic environment that influences all forms of individual and organizational decisions 
within the criminal justice system. This includes: public concerns over terrorist threats, 
potential riots, or other forms of antisocial behavior; financial constraints and a diminishing 
budget of public spending on criminal justice sectors; and the publication of crime statistics 
and their political implications. The idea of the field describes a more proximate legal 
decision-making context defined by political conceptions of the ends that are served by the 
law, by legal regulations that are designed to secure those ends, and by political perceptions 
of how those provisions ought to be used in order to further this objective. The term frame is 
concerned with a number of variables that form the subjective aspects of decision-making. It 
                                                
4 Jacqueline Hodgson, EU Criminal Justice: Crime Control and Due Process within a Framework of 
Mutual Recognition, 37 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 307 (2011); Jacqueline Hodgson, 
Safeguarding Suspects’ Rights in EU Criminal Justice: A Comparative Perspective, 14 New Crim. 
L. Rev. 611 (2011); see also Donald Dripps, On Reach and Grasp in Criminal Procedure: 
Crawford in California, 37 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 349 (2011). 
5 Keith Hawkins, Order, Rationality and Silence: Some Reflections on Criminal Justice Decision-
Making, in Exercising Discretion: Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System and Beyond 
187 (Loraine Gelsthorpe & Nicola Padfield eds., 2003). 
can refer to cognitive matters of the individual or illicit considerations such as the social 
class, ethnicity, or agenda of the accused. 
A. Sociopolitical Culture 
As we focus on surround for a moment, we see that a number of empirical studies suggest 
that the criminal process cannot be meaningfully understood apart from its sociopolitical 
culture. Here criminal procedure is not merely a branch of law; it is an integral part of a 
superstructure, which appreciates the “meaningful nature of the social world and the 
phenomena studied.”6 To understand how criminal justice functions, one must therefore 
consider a variety of social, economic, and political factors that serve as constraints and 
drivers of criminal justice in a particular context, studying how the wider social environment 
shapes the criminal process and its daily practices, and the impact that criminal justice has on 
society. 
This broader sociopolitical context is often more apparent when looking comparatively 
at another legal system. A good example of this contextual approach is Mike McConville et 
al.’s empirical inquiry into criminal justice in China.7 After immersion within that system for 
a significant period of time, the authors emphasize that Chinese criminal justice cannot 
simply be approached by relying on the “usual analytical grids,” such as its promulgated 
laws, official documents, the roles of legal actors, or even public hearings, all of which have 
reached their limits in this particular instance. The authors conclude that the system can only 
be understood through knowing the specific sociopolitical context within which the criminal 
justice apparatus operates that “gives it its character, infuses it with particular values, 
                                                
6 David Matza, Becoming Deviant 85 (1969). 
7 Mike McConville et al., Criminal Justice in China: An Empirical Inquiry (2011). 
determinants and performance indicators—which are necessarily largely systemic and non-
individuated—and directs the conduct of those who run it on a daily basis.”8 
If we stay with China for a moment, we note that this finding is also reflected in Mou’s 
research of the Chinese prosecution service, conducted through extensive observations, case 
file analysis, and semi-structured interviews.9 She suggests that the unique supervisory 
function of the Chinese prosecution service and its relationship with other criminal justice 
institutions (such as the police and the courts) should be set against China’s specific political 
backdrop, which was influenced by the Soviet legal system. The behavior of prosecutors 
cannot be understood with reference only to the law. Institutional and political mandates 
inform all aspects of the prosecution function and better explain the nature and motivation of 
prosecutorial decision-making. 
The significance of the social and political background to a criminal justice system can 
also be found in other comparative empirical studies. For instance, Cape and Namoradze 
indicate that some Eastern European institutions are also influenced by the country’s Soviet 
legacy, which in many ways hinders the effectiveness of criminal justice reforms and remains 
a continuing dominant force.10 Field’s observation of the cour d’assises suggests that French 
criminal courts’ preoccupation with the defendant’s character can be traced back to the 
French Revolution, which embedded the value of social cohesion.11 Also in France, 
Hodgson’s ethnography of investigation and prosecution explored the nature of judicial 
                                                
8 Id. at 450. 
9 Yu Mou, Overseeing Criminal Justice: The Supervisory Role of the Public Prosecution Service in 
China, 44 J.L. & Soc. 620 (2017). 
10 Ed Cape & Zaza Namoradze, Effective Criminal Defense in Eastern Europe 445–68 (2012). 
11 Stewart Field, State, Citizen and Character in French Criminal Process, 33 J.L. & Soc. 522 (2006). 
supervision as it operated in practice and as understood by legal actors themselves.12 She 
found that most of the supervision is carried out by the public prosecutor, who, although 
accountable to the Minister of Justice and working closely with the police, is understood as 
an independent judicial officer. Key to this understanding of the prosecutor’s role is the 
strength and pervasiveness of the French Republican tradition, which sees prosecution 
accountability to the executive, and so to the people, not as an impediment, but a guarantee of 
independence.13 Comparative studies in particular demonstrate that this broader politico-legal 
context is important in understanding the construction of the prosecution function within 
different processes of criminal justice.14 
B. Occupational Culture 
In addition to the wider political culture within which criminal justice operates and by which 
it is shaped, the working culture of legal actors often exerts a more immediate influence on 
how work is carried out. This can be expressed as ideas, values, or attitudes shared by the 
group; or a process by which “patterns learned and created in the mind” are embodied in 
                                                
12 Jacqueline Hodgson, French Criminal Justice: A Comparative Account of the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Crime in France (2005). 
13 The recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, however, found the 
French public prosecutor not to be a judicial officer for the purpose of Article 5 ECHR. See 
Jacqueline Hodgson, The French Prosecutor in Question, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1361 (2010). 
14 Jacqueline Hodgson, The Democratic Accountability of Prosecutors in England and Wales and 
France: Independence, Discretion and Managerialism, in Prosecutors and Democracy: A Cross-
National Study (Máximo Langer & David Sklansky eds., 2017). 
communication and other interpersonal relationships; or in more concrete form as “artifacts” 
produced out of institutional creativity that is distinctive to the group.15 
In this sense, culture constitutes the concept of the field that influences decisions relating 
to the criminal process, of which a dominant example is that of police subculture. Reiner, for 
example, defines police culture as “complex ensembles of values, attitudes, symbols, rules, 
recipes, and practices.”16 The study of police culture was derived from early ethnographic 
studies inside the police, where researchers found that the way officers enforce the law is 
rarely guided by legal precepts, but rather some “informal occupational norms and values 
operating under the apparently rigid hierarchical structure of police organizations.”17 
Since then, police occupational culture has been researched extensively to understand the 
exercise of police discretion and the negative “working personality” that potentially subverts 
or obstructs external reforms affecting officers.18 For example, Fielding approached police 
                                                
15 Ben Bowling & Coretta Phillips, Racism, Crime and Criminal Justice 81 (2001). 
16 Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police 118 (2010). 
17 Janet Chan, Changing Police Culture, 36 Brit. J. Criminology 109, 110 (1996). For early 
ethnographic studies see Michael Banton, The Policeman in the Community (1964); Jerome 
Skolnick, Justice without Trial (1966); Maureen Cain, Society and the Policeman’s Role (1973); 
William Westley, Violence and the Police (1970); Peter Manning, Police Work: The Second 
Organization of Policing (1977); Peter Manning, The Encyclopedia of Police Science (William 
Bailey ed., 1989); Simon Holdaway, Inside British Police: A Force at Work (1983). 
18 Andrew Goldsmith, Taking Police Culture Seriously: Police Discretion and the Limits of Law, 1 
Policing & Society: Int’l J. 91 (1990); Janet Chan, Changing Police Culture, 36 Brit. J. 
Criminology 109 (1996); Janet Chan, Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society 
(1997); Peter Waddington, Police (Canteen) Sub-culture: An Appreciation, 39 Brit. J. Criminology 
culture from a gendered perspective and argued that the aggressive, competitive, macho 
values perpetuated by so-called “canteen culture” contribute to miscarriages of justice and 
could lead to a crisis of police legitimacy.19 Holdaway’s study of race within the police force 
suggests that the racialized rank-and-file occupational culture of officers is an outcome of a 
social process that constructs and sustains “race” in relation to the demands of the work they 
undertake.20 In recent research on the recorded stop and search/account reform in the wake of 
the death of Stephen Lawrence,21 Michael Shiner probed into the psychological defense 
mechanisms (such as denial, projection, splitting, and fantasies) employed by the police to 
ward off threats to their institutional ego. In examining the way that the police react to “the 
trauma of institutional racism,” Shiner argues that police culture should be perceived as the 
collective minds of those involved, which are able to respond defensively to resist external 
                                                                                                                                                  
287 (1999); Jan Terpstra & Dorian Schapp, Police Culture, Stress Conditions and Working Styles, 
10 Eur. J. Criminology 57 (2013). 
19 Nigel Fielding, Cop Canteen Culture, in Just Boys Doing Business 46, 62–64 (Tim Newburn & 
Elizabeth A Stanko eds., 1994). 
20 Simon Holdaway, Constructing and Sustaining “Race” within the Police Workforce, 48 Brit. J. 
Sociology 18 (1997). 
21 The changed stop and search/account practice requires police officers to make a record of all stops 
and to provide a copy to the person who has been stopped. This is one of the seventy reform 
recommendations made by the judicial inquiry (Macpherson report) that looked into matters arising 
from the death of a black British teenager who was murdered in an unprovoked, racially motivated 
attack in London in 1993. The Macpherson report examined the flawed investigation conducted by 
the police and declared that the failure was caused by “a combination of professional 
incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers” Cluny 
MacPherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry 46.1 (1999). 
forces, thereby blunting policing reform.22 Presenting an alternative account, Waddington 
reminds us that what the police discuss in the “remote recessive” canteen may not 
automatically be translated into their actions on the street.23 The concept of “canteen culture” 
is in many ways merely a rhetoric that “gives meaning to experience and sustains 
occupational self-esteem”;24 hence it should not be seen simply as a taken-for-granted 
explanation accounting for all negative values, beliefs, and attitudes (such as macho, racist, 
and sexist) of the police. 
C. Culture as Rhetoric 
In addition to identifying factors that shape decision-making, socio-legal researchers also 
explore the significance of the gap between law’s rhetoric and law’s practice. Findings of 
malpractice or rule breaking are themselves problematic, but when situated within the wider 
framework of legal procedural protections and guarantees, they become more so. For 
example, poor quality custodial legal advice also has implications for the treatment of the 
accused later in the criminal process.25 In contrast to unrepresented suspects who are 
understood to have been denied the advice and protection provided by a lawyer, appeal courts 
in the 1990s were unwilling to allow appellants who, on the face of it, received custodial 
                                                
22 Michael Shiner, Post–Lawrence Policing in England and Wales, 50 Brit. J. Criminology 935, 949 
(2010). 
23 Peter Waddington, Police (Canteen) Sub-culture: An Appreciation, 39 Brit. J. Criminology 287, 
297 (1999). 
24 Id. at 295. 
25 Andrew Sanders et al., Advice and Assistance at Police Stations and the 24-Hour Duty Solicitor 
Scheme (1989); Mike McConville & Jacqueline Hodgson, Custodial Legal Advice and the Right to 
Silence (1993). 
legal advice, to challenge interrogation evidence. In fact, many of these suspects had not 
received anything that could meaningfully be termed “legal assistance,” meaning that 
appellants were credited with a benefit that they had never received.26 
This “culture as rhetoric” approach emphasizes the extent to which reality on the ground 
differs from the idealized legal culture inscribed within the text and the rhetoric of the law. 
Within French criminal justice, features central to inquisitorial systems, such as the ideology 
of judicial supervision, are generally considered to define its structures and procedures, 
providing different procedural guarantees to those found in more party-based adversarial 
procedure. Within this legal tradition, the judiciary is entrusted as the guardian of the public 
interest to safeguard the rights of the accused, requiring the defense to play a much smaller 
part than in the adversarial model. In contrast to the confirmation bias that has been observed 
in police investigations and miscarriages of justice in a variety of jurisdictions, the single, 
neutral judicial enquiry offers a model of non-partisan enquiry in which evidence 
exculpating, as well as incriminating, the suspect is investigated. However, Hodgson found 
that in practice, in most cases judicial supervision is understood to be provided by the public 
prosecutor (the procureur), rather than the more independent juge d’instruction. Furthermore, 
prosecutorial “supervision” is largely bureaucratic and retrospective, offering little more than 
a file-based review. 
Sanders et al. have observed in relation to England and Wales that there is a gap between 
the rhetoric of the overall system (which claims to be due process), the legal rules (which 
reflect mixed values), and the reality (which is largely crime control).27 For example, the law 
requires reasonable suspicion in the exercise of police powers, but McBarnet has observed 
                                                
26 Jacqueline Hodgson, Tipping the Scales of Justice: The Suspect’s Right to Legal Advice, 1992 
Crim. L. R. 854. 
27 Andrew Sanders et al., Criminal Justice 741 (2010). 
that many police practices that might popularly be understood as deviant are in fact permitted 
within the text of the law, which allows for broad discretion. Furthermore, even where 
procedures are clearly established in statute, working rules and practices are used to 
circumvent these requirements.28 For example, Dixon et al. found that officers got around the 
statutory requirement of reasonable suspicion as a base for a stop and search by asking the 
person if the officer could search them.29 If he or she agreed, the police considered this a 
“consent” search rather than a search carried out under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (PACE) and so statutory safeguards were considered not to apply. The net result of 
legal rules regulating behavior or criminal procedure, therefore, can be to legitimate the 
reverse. 
In China, McConville et al. observe that law reform resulted only in a change in the way 
that state officials account for their behaviors that, otherwise, remain largely unaffected.30 
Mou too found that despite the introduction of new due process safeguards in the Criminal 
Procedure Law in 2012, criminal justice continues to be dominated by the working rules of 
the legal apparatus, structured by the political mandate, the value of hierarchical structures 
and deference to authority, and a strong emphasis on retribution.31 State officials who work 
under the new legal regime have made no changes in their routine practices and ideology. In 
this respect, it is not surprising that there exists an entrenched culture within the Chinese 
system, which ignores or violates the formal due process rules that are in many ways alien to 
                                                
28 Doreen McBarnet, Conviction: Law, the State and Construction of Justice 4–5 (1981). 
29 David Dixon et al., Safeguarding the Rights of Suspects in Police Custody, 1 Policing & Soc’y: 
Int’l J. 115 (1990). 
30 McConville et al., supra note 7, at 425–74. 
31 Yu Mou, Written Evidence and the Absence of Witnesses: The Inevitability of Conviction in 
Chinese Criminal Justice 249–79, PhD thesis, University of Warwick 2015. 
it. This systemic transgression undermines the authority of the law, yet the law retains its 
power: it legitimates state practice and prevents the expression of critical judgment. 
As with the various accounts of police culture, empirical researchers purporting to 
observe the same phenomena—the work and practices of criminal defense lawyers—do not 
always agree. McConville et al.’s wide-ranging study of the organization and practices of 
defense lawyers in forty-eight firms across England and Wales was criticized by Travers for 
presenting “a partial and one-sided account of the day-to-day activities of . . . criminal 
defense lawyers” built up by “a great deal of selection and omission” that “shows lawyers 
and clerks in a bad light.”32 In attacking McConville et al.’s analysis and research strategy, 
Travers used his own four-month ethnographic research in one law firm as an example, citing 
the importance of thick description of the context. In his research of “the work and talk” in 
the law firm, Travers proffered a glowing account of defense lawyers unreservedly devoted 
to their clients and satisfied clients who appreciated the standard of care they received.33 
However, in addition to the limited sample of a single firm, Bridges et al. warn that by 
treating lawyers’ perspectives unquestioningly, Travers’s approach could easily “end up 
accepting at face value practitioners’ own rationalizations for their (mal)practices.”34 
In the face of the oppositional images portrayed by the two studies, Newman’s empirical 
enquiry was tasked to judge “which finding held good” by adopting an integrated 
methodology.35 Although (a little like Travers) Newman’s initial motivation was to support 
                                                
32 Max Travers, The Reality of Law: Work and Talk in a Firm of Criminal Lawyers 370 (1997). 
33 Max Travers, Preaching to the Converted? Improving the Persuasiveness of Criminal Justice 
Research, 37 Brit. J. Criminology 359 (1997). 
34 Lee Bridges et al., Can Critical Research Influence Policy? A Response to Max Travers, 37 Brit. J. 
Criminology 378, 379 (1997). 
35 Daniel Newman, Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice 27–30 (2013). 
“the noble cause” that legal aid lawyers pursue, what he observed in the law firms had strong 
resonance with McConville et al.’s conclusion.36 In this updated study of the lawyer-client 
relationship, the professional standards of defense lawyers have not improved: they were 
observed to have treated their clients with disrespect, pushed them to plead guilty, and 
utilized their professional knowledge to control their clients. Newman illustrates the sharp 
discrepancy between how lawyers presented themselves when interviewed and the way they 
acted when observed. On the one hand, lawyers in interviews described themselves as 
dedicated professionals who fostered healthy relations with other legal actors for the benefit 
of the client; on the other, the participant observation revealed a rather different and 
depressing reality, “damning for this branch of the legal profession and tragic for the clients 
who depend on them.”37 
In this regard, the professional claims made by the lawyers in Newman’s study can also 
be understood as rhetoric. Joan Leach suggests that rhetoric, as a conviction in the power of 
language, can shape the perception of the world and structure our way of thinking.38 It is a 
pervasive way of communicating and interacting with people, which is constructed to justify 
a position as well as to attack any counterarguments. Thus, there are two functions of 
rhetoric: building up an idealized account (the “reification”) and undermining of the reality 
discovered by others (the “ironizing”).39 Whereas empirical researchers should be wary of 
rhetoric that seeks to deflect from the truth, it is not meaningless and therefore does not 
                                                
36 Id. at 143–68. 
37 Id. at 147–52 & abstract. 
38 Joan Leach, Rhetorical Analysis, in Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: A 
Practical Handbook 207 (Martin Bauer & George Gaskell eds., 2000). 
39 Jonathan Potter, Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction 106–08 
(1996); Newman, supra note 35, at 151. 
warrant being dismissed. Rhetoric can express the law’s claims and aspirations, and the ways 
that legal actors such as defense lawyers and public prosecutors believe themselves to be 
acting—protecting their client’s interests or overseeing the police investigation to discover 
the truth. At the end of his book, Newman suggests that rhetoric somehow embodies the 
values that did and could exist and reflects the optimistic belief held by criminal defense 
lawyers. 
III. Justice on the Ground and Discretionary Power 
In outlining the broad setting of a cultural surround or organizational field that criminal 
justice activities take place, we have noted that one of the main achievements of empirical 
research has been to provide detailed accounts of how certain factors and considerations have 
influenced the way legal actors respond to legal and organizational mandates—the frame that 
decision-makers employ in deciding. This section highlights some of the empirical research 
on decision-making processes within the criminal justice system in England and Wales. We 
focus in particular on the exercise of discretion, a cornerstone of criminal justice that infuses 
all areas of practice and reveals something of the limits of the law as well as the broader 
exercise of power. 
A. Police Discretion: Stop, Search, Charge 
As already discussed, the hiatus between the official description of the way a certain process 
ought to work and how that process operates in practice is well recognized in empirical 
research. Institutions as large as the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), for 
instance, are inevitably subject to gaps between perception and reality, with their practices 
varying within units and at different organizational levels. It is also impossible to prescribe 
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every action of police officers or prosecutors—the law necessarily allows them a broad 
degree of discretion in determining how to respond to each situation or case. One of the 
missions of empirical research is to make people aware of what exists in the gaps between 
theory and practice and in many instances, this will focus on how and why discretion is 
exercised in particular ways.40 For example, in McConville et al.’s study of the construction 
of prosecution cases in England and Wales, the authors argue that the police, who dominate 
the evidence-gathering process, are accorded a high degree of autonomy to disregard 
competing accounts and construct the file of evidence toward conviction.41 In mapping the 
way that prosecution cases develop from vague suspicions to carefully constructed edifices, 
their research demonstrates the ways in which rules and laws governing detention and 
interrogation can assist the police to create a suspect population. This understanding of case 
construction challenges Packer’s Due Process/Crime Control dichotomy and undercuts the 
due process principles championed by PACE.42 As McBarnet has argued in relation to the 
permissive nature of the legal text, their findings suggest that the rules that provide 
safeguards for the suspect can also serve crime control purposes: the enabling law is 
employed by the police to rationalize behavior undertaken for other reasons, and is rarely a 
consideration to regulate their behaviors. 
In line with this pessimistic view of enabling law, the open-textured nature of the law 
and the latitude it offers are also exemplified in literature around the police power to stop and 
search. Empirical studies have suggested that ethnic minorities are selectively targeted by the 
                                                
40 Anthony Edwards, The Value of Empirical Research in Criminal Justice, 8 Crim. L. Rev. 533 
(1997). 
41 Mike McConville et al., The Case for the Prosecution, ch. 5 (1991). 
42 Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Part II (1968). 
police for discriminatory reasons.43 Following the inquiry into the murder of the black 
teenager Stephen Lawrence, the Macpherson report found that the police enjoyed only low 
levels of trust within ethnic minority communities, and stops and searches were clearly the 
“core conclusion of racist stereotyping.”44 The use of racial stereotyping, and poor 
relationships between the police and the black community in particular, is not new,45 and 
recent studies point to continuing concerns in the use of stop-and-search powers, though 
researchers disagree as to how this should be measured: with reference to the residential 
population or those present in the area — the “availability” approach.46 
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The use of stereotyping in police stop and search is not limited to skin color. As Quinton 
et al. suggest, even clothing and vehicle type can influence the exercise of police discretion.47 
In his ethnographic study, Choongh reports that the police have an entrenched prejudice 
against working class people, who are often seen as criminal-minded and dangerous. Parallel 
with McConville et al.’s research, he also argues that the law enables, rather than controls or 
constrains police discretion. In his account of police station procedures, police activities 
cannot be understood simply by reference to their responsibility to control and prevent 
crime—more importantly, they embody order and authority; suspects, who normally come 
from less privileged social backgrounds and ethnic origins, represent a threat to the orderly 
middle-class fabric and are in need of discipline by coercive power.48 
Aside from illicit social considerations, police discretion is also influenced by other 
variables, especially the context in which the investigation takes place.49 For example, Kemp 
found that the “offenses brought to justice” (OBTJ) performance indicator plays a significant 
role in the police’s decision-making process. The police performance indicator is part and 
parcel of a “command and control” style of managerial framework designed to ensure a 
commitment from the top down of the hierarchical organization. To meet the target, the 
majority of cases (including borderline criminal activities) are channeled to formal actions 
once they are reported to the police. In order to fulfill the required detection rate, the police 
target “easy hits” and minor offenses, failing to record crimes honestly, misusing cautions 
etc. to manipulate the figures. In attempting to reduce the number of cases dropped with no 
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further action, the logic of response rate measures is to widen the net of criminalization to 
target easy wins, often at the expense of investigating more serious offenses.50 
It is interesting to see how empirical research has identified the same trends across quite 
different jurisdictions, with the same consequences. In France, this same process has 
occurred, as so-called “third way” alternatives to prosecution and trial are used to ensure that 
fewer cases are discontinued. The result in many areas is that prosecutors are focusing on 
minor offenses and devoting insufficient time and resources to more serious crime. This in 
turn has caused deterioration in prosecutor-police relations.51 Officers resent the close 
scrutiny of their actions concerning relatively minor offenses, preferring the more light touch 
oversight that they enjoy in their relationship with the juge d’instruction.52 Similarly in 
China, the police are found to have diverted a significant amount of resources into dealing 
with minor drug dealing and dangerous driving offenses in order to fulfill performance 
indicators, paying little attention to more serious and complex fraud offenses.53 
B. Police Discretion: Enabling Suspects’ Rights 
Discretion is not confined to whether certain rules and procedures are conformed with; it is 
also about how the requirements are met in fulfilling the aims and purposes of criminal 
justice. It can be embodied in the police’s attitude, for instance, which has an impact on the 
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rights of the defense. When suspects are confused or uncertain whether to seek advice from 
legal counsel in police stations, the suggestion of the police (and especially of the custody 
officer, understood as the gatekeeper to the suspect’s rights) might tip the balance. 
Empirical research over the last three decades has identified that the police in a number 
of procedurally very different jurisdictions have resisted the introduction of a statutory right 
to custodial legal assistance in similar ways. Typically they may discourage the suspect from 
requesting a solicitor by telling him that he does not need one, by failing to mention that 
advice is free at the point of delivery,54 or by persuading suspects who have sought legal 
advice to change their mind.55 
The techniques used by the police to undermine suspects’ access to legal rights can be 
imperceptible. For instance, defense lawyers could be barred from entering the police custody 
suite, creating an impression for suspects that requesting a lawyer would be time-consuming. 
This in turn might lead the suspect to give up the request, or to switch to less effective legal 
services, such as telephone contact. Similarly, whereas delays can be caused by a host of 
factors (such as the police investigation or charging process), police have constantly utilized 
the risk of delays to discourage suspects from having legal advice.56 Here, it is not the wider 
legal culture that has been seen to determine police behavior (the surround or the field), but 
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the more immediate threat (as the defense lawyer is understood to be) to the police mandate 
to investigate and gather evidence for the prosecution. In particular, the presence of the 
defense lawyer on police territory challenges the frame of police culture: the questioning of 
the suspect in order to obtain an admission. It is only when the defense lawyer’s presence is 
seen to be compatible with the police task of interrogation (for example, when represented 
suspects regularly refrain from exercising their right to silence) that her role comes to be 
accepted. 
In addition to managing suspects’ access to defense lawyers, the police have substantial 
control over the disclosure of evidence. They have the option to decide the amount of 
evidence that they are willing to disclose to the suspect or the suspect’s lawyer, either before 
or during the interview. This has resulted in varied legal practices, with some officers being 
more forthcoming with evidence and others tending to hold back information from the 
defense.57 Sukumar et al.’s observations of police station disclosure reveal that while police 
have generally satisfied the minimal requirement, evidence disclosure tactics (such as 
withholding information prior to the interview, exaggerating the strength of the evidence, use 
of evidence as an ambush) have frequently been used to pressure the suspect into making an 
admission of guilt.58 
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C. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Criminal justice as a system is organized to allow decisions to be made serially. When a 
police case is handed on from the police to the prosecution, until (and even at) the point of 
case disposition, discretionary power is dispersed across criminal justice institutions and 
individuals.59 Prosecutorial discretion, for instance, enables the prosecutor to “respond 
sensitively to the great diversity of factual situations and policy issues.”60Although 
prosecutorial discretion is traditionally associated with the opportunity principle, which 
grants prosecutors a broad flexibility to take into account factors other than evidence in 
making their decisions, it is also compatible with the principle of legality, provided that the 
decision is not arbitrary. 
In England and Wales where the opportunity principle prevails, the decision to prosecute 
was historically part of the police function. This historical legacy has meant that the relatively 
recently created public prosecution service, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), remains 
subordinate to the power of the police in many respects. This relationship was presaged in 
Moody and Tombs’s empirical study of the Scottish procurator fiscal, which suggested that 
the prosecution service, even if it has a sphere of responsibility that is independent, is still 
largely dependent on the police who provide the information and determine the way in which 
it is presented.61 This concern was further raised in Mansfield and Peay’s research, which 
concluded that independence for the prosecutor may not be created simply by demarcating 
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the role of investigators of crime and reallocating responsibility for the decision to 
prosecute.62 
Issues concerning how the Crown Prosecutor exercises discretion are explored in the 
Home Office research conducted by Crisp and Moxon. They found that although a good 
proportion of cases have effectively been filtered out of the system following the 
establishment of the CPS, some of the cases were dropped unnecessarily, because the police 
did not always respond to Crown Prosecutors’ requests for further investigations.63 With 
friction between the CPS and the police continuing to cause problems, the government 
proposed placing Crown Prosecutors in police stations in order to be on hand to provide pre-
charge advice and to improve working relationships by fostering closer cooperation with the 
police. A pilot was conducted in twelve sites, but Hunt and Baldwin’s study of the scheme 
concluded that it was ineffective. Crown Prosecutors have no authority to direct the police to 
take their advice, and so making prosecutors available for pre-charge advice and consultation 
will “cater only for those officers perceptive enough to recognize a legal problem when they 
see one. This means that those officers in greatest need of advice are the ones least likely to 
benefit from what is on offer.” 64 
The subsequent statutory charging scheme saw prosecutors located in police stations in 
England and Wales to advise on charges. It was hoped that this might improve relations and 
provide a more unified approach, but it was discontinued in favor of a centralized telephone 
                                                
62 Graham Mansfield & Jill Peay, The Director of Public Prosecutions: Principles and Practices for 
the Crown Prosecutor 46–50 (1987). 
63 Debbie Crisp & David Moxon, Case Screening by the Crown Prosecution Service: How and Why 
Cases Are Terminated 28–29 (1994). 
64 Adrian Hunt & John Baldwin, Prosecutors Advising in Police Stations, 8 Crim. L. Rev. 521, 536 
(1998). 
system. Soubise’s research suggests that co-location at the police station did not improve 
police-prosecutor relations. Crown Prosecutors told her in interviews that officers sometimes 
sought to pressure them into charging suspects: “The disadvantage [of being based at the 
police station] is basically the police can exercise pressure on you. You might have two or 
three officers . . . and they’re sort of asking you questions and challenging your decisions 
there and then, which can be quite, I suppose, intimidating.”65 
Crown Prosecutors exercise considerable discretion when deciding whether a 
prosecution is justified on evidential grounds and in the public interest. The prosecution in 
England and Wales has long been criticized for not being robust enough to terminate those 
cases that do not have enough evidence to reach the threshold to stand jury trial. In the Crown 
Court study conducted by Zander and Henderson, judges and barristers suggested that weak 
prosecution cases account for 20 percent of all contested cases, and a number of them (4–8 
percent) ended in conviction.66 In exploring the reasons that led the CPS to continue these 
weak cases, Baldwin pointed out that the CPS decision is overly dependent on police views 
(following the findings of McConville et al.), and the failure of these prosecution cases lies 
primarily in its reliance on a single, often vulnerable, witness, where there are unpredictable 
contingencies that cause collapse of prosecutions.67 Strikingly, he found that many difficult 
cases where weaknesses were identified and consciously itemized still proceeded to trial. 
CPS lawyers relied on “instinct,” “feeling,” and “intuition,” rather than required legal 
techniques, in conducting case reviews. When applying the evidential sufficiency test, Crown 
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Prosecutors were unduly influenced by the gravity of the offense, thereby “clouding their 
judgments, pervading their thinking and approach, and inhibiting them in taking decisions to 
discontinue prosecutions.”68 
D. Discretion in the Jury Room 
In contrast to the professional and legally regulated role played by police, prosecutors, and 
defense lawyers, the jury exists to provide a lay perspective. The judge provides legal 
direction, but ultimately, the jury determines the facts that in turn determine the guilt of the 
accused. With few rules on how jurors should evaluate evidence and determine the truth of 
witnesses, how do they arrive at their decision? As the least regulated and least visible form 
of decision-making in the criminal process (jurors provide no reasons for their verdict), juror 
behavior has long fascinated researchers. What happens when cases are tried by jury? Is this 
a fair and democratic process that ensures justice by injecting the experiences of ordinary 
citizens into adjudication on criminal guilt? Or is it an unregulated and unaccountable process 
that permits prejudice and discrimination into the justice process, without the possibility of 
challenge? Does lay decision-making temper the extremes of repeat player adversarial 
lawyers, or are jurors unable to resist the persuasive tactics of courtroom advocacy? 
Despite legislation constraining empirical research conducted by using real jurors, there 
has been a large body of literature in common law countries (especially England and Wales, 
the United States, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia) devoted to different aspects of the 
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jury undertaken by legal scholars, social scientists, and experimental psychologists,69 many 
of them well captured in Darbyshire et al.’s comprehensive literature summary.70 
Early in the 1970s, McCabe and Purves conducted arguably the best shadow jury 
experiment to date. The experiment was a replica of a real jury working process: the subjects 
were selected from the electoral register, watched court trials, deliberated and delivered 
verdicts just like actual juries.71 A number of studies have also been dedicated to exploring 
the views of participants involved in the trial,72 observing “simulated” or “mock” 
juries,73comparing jury verdicts with professional opinions,74 and conducting questionnaires 
with actual jurors after the trial.75 
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More recent mock jury studies have diverged in their findings. Cheryl Thomas has 
explored the fairness of jury decision-making, using a “multi-method” approach, which 
encompasses a controlled simulation study, a large-scale analysis of all jury verdicts in 
Crown Courts in England and Wales between October 2006 and March 2008, and a post-trial 
survey of 668 jurors in sixty-two cases.76 It examined some of the most critical factors that 
potentially influence the fairness of jury decision-making, including racial discrimination, 
consistency of jury verdicts, and jurors’ comprehension of directions on the law. This 
research has dispelled some myths of jury trial, such that juries in certain areas do not convict 
and juries tend to acquit for certain offenses. The analysis suggests that jury trials are in fact 
very efficient, with less than 1 percent of juries being discharged and hung juries only 
occurring in 0.6 percent of the cases. Perhaps one of the more surprising findings of this 
study is that there are more convictions than acquittals in rape cases, which are even higher 
than other serious offenses, including attempted murder, manslaughter, and causing grievous 
bodily harm.77 
Finch and Munro, and Ellison and Munro’s research has focused on jury verdicts in rape 
trials and presents a less positive picture of juror behavior and motivation. The authors 
conducted a series of focus groups, trial reconstructions, and trial simulations to explore 
jurors’ understanding and discussion of the critical issues in trials of rape cases, such as 
consent, complainant’s intoxication status, public expectations regarding socio-sexual 
conduct, and the complainant’s credibility in relation to her conduct during and post-
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assault.78 In Ellison and Munro’s recent study, 160 members of the public observed mini rape 
trial re-enactments, before then deliberating in jury groups. The authors found that juries, 
whether provided with written or oral directions, tended to fall back on their own personal 
views and experiences, rather than taking seriously the evidential burden to prove guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt. They also sought to understand how jurors might be affected by 
different modes of presenting evidence—live video links, screens, and prerecorded 
evidence.79 Research suggests that victim witnesses find these measures helpful,80 but the 
impact on jury decision-making had not been explored—in particular, the impact of 
disrupting the sequential narrative that jurors often find helpful in making sense of evidence. 
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The research found that there was no clear and consistent response to different modes of 
evidence presentation in cases of adult female rape complainants. They were as likely to 
result in adverse prejudice to the victim as to the accused, leading the authors to conclude that 
their overall impact was not detrimental to the fairness of the trial.81 
IV. Policy and Criminal Justice Reforms 
Gessner and Thomas suggest that sociolegal research can be roughly categorized into two 
types: one evaluates the way law functions in a particular organizational, social, or political 
context; the other concerns policies, especially the intended or unintended consequences of 
law enforcement.82 When it comes to criminal justice research, however, this distinction is 
very much blurred. Policy implementation has been an integrated part of the operation of the 
law enforcement agencies, and empirical researchers often cannot avoid considering the 
influence of policy when making sense of the way legal institutions function. Policy itself is a 
broad term and might be understood as a course of action proposed by the governing body of 
the state (public policy), which impacts on various aspects of the domain of criminal justice; 
but in less normative terms, it can also represent a system of more or less formalized 
principles adopted by criminal justice institutions (criminal justice policy) to guide decisions 
and pursue specified outcomes. Depending on the specific meaning that is implied, it can be a 
component part of the social surround, field, and frame that shapes criminal justice decision-
making. 
                                                
81 Ellison & Munro, A “Special” Delivery?, supra note 78. 
82 Volkmar Gessner & John Thomas, Socio-legal Research and Policy Studies: A Review of the 
Issues, 10 L. & Pol’y 85 (1988). 
A. Austerity and Criminal Defense and Prosecution Practices in 
England and Wales 
The consequences of government public sector austerity for the delivery of legal services and 
all aspects of the criminal justice process from policing through to prisons are examples of 
how public policies can direct criminal justice. Although an integral component of the right 
to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) and a necessary part of the proper functioning of adversarial 
procedure, the funding and provision of criminal defense services has been hard hit by 
government austerity. By 2014, the cost-cutting of public spending on criminal legal aid in 
England had accumulated to over £120 million, which, inevitably, has had a detrimental 
effect on defense rights of the accused.83 For instance, Skinns indicates that since the fee paid 
to visit the police station has been capped to include all costs incurred, duty lawyers are less 
willing physically to attend police interviews. As such, some suspects have to rely on 
telephone legal advice.84 Alongside concerns around confidentiality, the absence of face-to-
face contact undermines the lawyer’s ability to establish the trust necessary for an effective 
lawyer-client relationship and so to assess and advise the suspect and begin to develop a 
defense strategy.85 As already discussed, evidence disclosure by the police is also contingent 
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on personal relationships, so it is unlikely that the lawyer will learn as much about the case 
without attending the police station in person. For these kinds of reasons, earlier research 
suggests that telephone advice can jeopardize the already vulnerable situation of the suspect 
by giving inappropriate advice.86 It should be noted that telephone advice is not always the 
result of a lack of resources. Only one-eighth of suspects receiving custodial legal advice in 
Scotland between 2011 and 2013 were personally attended by a lawyer; the majority were 
provided with telephone advice. Lawyers in Scotland have argued that within an evidential 
framework that requires corroboration, silence is always the best advice, and this could be 
done as effectively by telephone as in person.87 Some, however, recognize that silence is a 
difficult position to maintain, and the lawyer’s presence can assist suspects to resist persistent 
police questioning, especially if they have not been questioned by the police before.88 
Furthermore, empirical studies have demonstrated the poor quality of criminal defense 
work that existed in the 1980s and 1990s, with unqualified and untrained clerks carrying out 
the bulk of case preparation, including attending clients in the office and at the police 
station.89 Motivated by the greater profit that could be made from such wide-scale delegation, 
criminal defense solicitors failed to act in their client’s interests. Since then, significant 
improvements have been made to professional training, practice, and regulation to address 
these deficiencies, and these reforms have been reinforced by a legal aid framework that tied 
public funding to the quality of defense services. 
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However, despite the improvements made in defense lawyer standards90 and the often 
onerous nature of professional regulation, the sustained period of disinvestment in legal aid 
has made the reversion to poor practices almost inevitable. Within this chastened financial 
environment, lawyers have been found to adapt the service they are able to provide to “make 
ends meet,” with discontinuous representation and diminished time devoted to individual 
cases.91 The response in practice appears to be in accordance with Gwyn Bevan’s supplier-
induced demand thesis, which suggests that lawyers who simultaneously determine the cost 
of their work and secure a targeted income will inevitably abuse their position and conduct 
superfluous work in order to achieve monetary gains.92 Just as Fenn et al. observed in their 
research, lawyers sensitively adjusted their inputs according to the remuneration they 
received. The authors identified that when fixed standard fees were introduced that no longer 
cover the actual costs of defense work, defense lawyers switched to cost-control strategies, 
such as case-splitting and reduced time investment in case preparation and advocacy, to react 
to the constrained income.93 In contrast, Bridges et al. found solicitors working in the non-
profit Public Defender Service, where salaries were fixed independently of case numbers or 
work carried out, perform generally better than private practice lawyers: public defenders 
were able to provide a more “holistic, client-centered service, and to adopt a more rigorous 
approach when representing their clients.”94 
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The adoption of practices that seek to maximize efficiency, including the delegation of 
large portions of work, can also be seen in the working arrangements of the CPS, following 
the Optimum Business Model, introduced in 2008. Soubise describes how much of the case 
preparation is conducted by non-solicitors in a centralized and segmented system that sees 
files passed from one team to another, depending on the stage of the process the case has 
reached. Oversight by Crown Prosecutors is distant and no single lawyer retains case 
ownership, making difficult any discussion with defense counsel on disclosure or plea. Court 
work and trial preparation is also delegated to Associate Prosecutors—paralegals who have 
experience working in the CPS but who have received just two weeks of legal training. This 
work should be carried out under the supervision of Crown Prosecutors who alone are 
authorized to determine the charges to be brought. In practice, Soubise found that the 
pressure of the magistrates’ court docket required Associate Prosecutors to take decisions 
independently (sometimes directly contradicting the Crown Prosecutor’s written 
instructions), and only seek authorization retrospectively. This practice was tacitly 
acknowledged and the conclusion is that “[c]oncerns over flexibility and speed appear to 
overcome the need for accountability.” More fundamentally, “[c]uts to legal aid and the 
increase in the number of unrepresented defendants mean that many magistrates’ court 
hearings take place without qualified solicitors or barristers representing either party. This 
gives credibility to fears of ‘de-lawyerization’ of the magistrates’ court and concerns for the 
quality of justice in summary proceedings.”95 
B. Promoting Best Defense Practices in the EU 
                                                
95 Soubise, supra note 65; Laurène Soubise, Prosecuting in the Magistrates’ Courts in a Time of 
Austerity, Crim. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018). 
Internationally, empirical research is also a source of inspiration for constructive and 
effective programs and policies. In addition to empirical work that seeks to evaluate the 
success of criminal justice reforms, some studies take a forward-looking approach, providing 
accounts of practice to inform planned reform. A number of projects funded by the European 
Commission, for example, have been designed to bring together evidence of best practices as 
well as an understanding of what works and why. For empirical comparativists, this is a 
fascinating lens through which to study criminal justice—examining the practices of different 
criminal processes and the extent to which they are grounded in jurisdiction-specific cultures, 
and then identifying common strengths and weaknesses in their practical operation in order to 
shape and ensure the effectiveness of pan-European measures. 
A variety of empirical research projects have been connected to specific EU Directives 
and to EU reform more broadly. Some are primarily desk-based accounts of law and practice, 
supplemented by interviews,96 and others have new empirical data at the heart of the project. 
Spronken’s study examined the information provided in writing to suspects in EU states, 
concerning their rights while in police custody immediately following arrest. Using 
questionnaires and interviews, the researchers gathered accounts of what information was 
provided and how this was done. Although required by law to provide basic information to 
suspects, the researchers found that this was done in a variety of ways, many of them wholly 
inappropriate and ineffective. A number of countries provided information in writing and 
several adopted the format of a Letter of Rights, but the language and format differed widely. 
Based on examples of best practices, they recommended the use of a clear and detailed 
                                                
96 Cape et al. conducted a study of effective criminal defense in Europe (Belgium, England and 
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of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine). Ed Cape et al., Effective 
Criminal Defense in Europe (2010); Cape & Namoradze, supra note 10. 
template that ensured compliance with international norms such as the ECHR. The 
subsequent EU Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings drew on these 
findings and included such an indicative Letter of Rights. 97 
Vanderhallen et al.’s study of safeguards for young suspects during police interrogation 
also adopted a comparative European approach and focused specifically on best practices that 
might inform the proposed EU Directive.98 Using focus group interviews of police, lawyers, 
and appropriate adults, as well as young suspects themselves, together with audio and video 
recordings of a sample of interrogations with juveniles, the study found that, despite common 
obligations under the ECHR, there were significant differences in the ways that young 
suspects were treated during the criminal investigation and in particular, in the safeguards 
provided during police interrogation. England and Wales and the Netherlands, for example, 
treat young suspects in the same way as adults, with the provision of some additional 
safeguards, such as the appropriate adult (a parent or other adult whose role is to facilitate 
communication and ensure that the young person understands the process). Poland and 
Belgium, on the other hand, adopt a more paternalistic approach, dealing with matters 
through the family courts. Although apparently less punitive, this approach was found to 
deny agency to those under investigation; under it, young suspects enjoy fewer rights, yet 
ultimately, can still have their liberty taken away. This and other findings from the research 
informed a set of guidelines designed “to contribute to shaping, defining and improving the 
well-being of juveniles who come into contact with juvenile punitive justice.”99 
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Perhaps the most empirically rich of these recent comparative studies is that conducted 
across four jurisdictions by Blackstock et al. Researchers observed the detention and 
interrogation of suspects over a period of seventy-eight weeks, accompanying lawyers and 
being based in the police station for a number of weeks or months, thereby gaining both a 
police and defense perspective on the experience of custody.100 The observation periods were 
followed by ninety-four semi-structured interviews with police and lawyers in all 
jurisdictions. Researchers were able to see firsthand how suspects were informed of their 
rights; were assessed and provided with an interpreter; how they were able to access legal 
advice and the quality of that advice; and how the police questioned suspects. While some 
practices reflected different frameworks of legal regulation—such as French lawyers being 
restricted to a thirty-minute client consultation and playing a passive role during the suspect’s 
interrogation—other phenomena could be explained within a broader context of reform 
experience that was less about the specifics of the procedural roots of the jurisdiction and 
more about understanding the degree to which due process reforms had become embedded in 
a particular criminal process. 
This offers valuable lessons for reformers. For example, Dutch police officers were 
resistant to the idea of lawyers advising suspects and being present in the interrogation room. 
They felt this new reform would undermine the effectiveness of the investigation and so took 
steps to discourage suspects from exercising their right to custodial legal advice. Hodgson 
found that French police responded in the same way in the 1990s when lawyers were first 
permitted to consult with suspects for thirty minutes prior to the police interrogation, but over 
time, came to accept this role and even found it to be useful in providing reassurance to 
detainees.101 The same pattern was also observed in England and Wales in the 1980s 
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following the statutory right to custodial legal advice provided by Section 58 of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE).102 
These reforms occurred in different jurisdictions and in different decades, but the 
response of the police was the same. As discussed briefly above, believing that lawyers 
would interfere with and undermine the investigation, encourage the exercise of silence, 
provide false alibis to ensure suspects did not incriminate themselves, and generally behave 
in unhelpful or improper ways, officers across all jurisdictions engaged in strategies of rights 
avoidance designed to ensure that suspects were either unaware of the extent of their rights, 
or were disincentivized from exercising them. As a result, PACE Codes of Practice were 
altered to prohibit the police from discouraging suspects to exercise their rights, and EU 
legislation has also preempted some of these strategies. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This brief overview has focused on a selection of empirical research that assists us in 
understanding criminal justice practices and the way decisions are made in a complex 
environment. Hence, it is far from a comprehensive account of the empirical studies, and 
many important works, regrettably, are not included due to limited space. It is well 
recognized that studying the legal rules alone can offer only limited insights into the way 
state power is exercised, and legal rules cannot effectively illustrate obscure concepts such as 
discretion. Therefore, empirical research is a useful tool in exploring these critical aspects of 
criminal justice. 
Edwards argues that the public should not just be aware of what is supposed to happen, 
but is also entitled to know what actually happens.103 Hence, conducting empirical research 
                                                
102 Sanders et al., supra note 25. 
can be seen as a way of exercising the “right to know”—an engagement of the public and 
dissemination of knowledge by making specific criminal justice inquires. When embarking 
on empirical investigation, researchers face a range of challenges and a journey that is filled 
with uncertainties, risks, pitfalls, joys, and surprises. This choice, as Burton commented, is an 
“uncomfortable necessity in that it involves practice and ethical choices which represent real 
challenges for the researcher.”104 Although we do not have the room to discuss the 
methodological issues that exist in collecting and analyzing the data, it is necessary to 
appreciate the obstacles that empirical researchers often confront—funding, resources, time, 
training, access to the field and research subjects, experience, cultural and language barriers, 
and often uncomfortable relationships—that constrain the success of the research.105 Despite 
these challenges, the harvest outweighs the costs. There are also memorable stories behind 
every project, as many researchers have experienced and recalled.106 In this regard, empirical 
research is not merely a productive process of acquiring knowledge, it is also a valuable 
experience that enriches our life. 
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